The public is certainly familiar with the term “quick count,” or what is simply translated as hitung cepat. In reality, there is a lack of synergy between the concept of a quick count and its actual practice and methodology. A conceptual inaccuracy has occurred; this error is not merely technical, but carries a political context behind a mistake that continues to be reproduced.
Pre-election surveys (measuring electability and popularity), exit polls, and quick counts are all survey methods that utilize probability sampling (taking a random portion of the entire population to serve as a sample). All three share the same research methods and techniques, which are fundamentally defined as surveys. They are distinguished only by two important factors: the sample unit and the time phase.
In terms of sample units, pre-election surveys and exit polls are similar in that their units are individuals. However, they differ in timing: pre-election surveys are conducted before the election, targeting potential voters, while exit polls are conducted after the election, targeting voters who have just exercised their right to vote upon leaving the polling station (TPS). Meanwhile, a quick count is conducted after the voting phase, but the sample unit is not the individual voter, but the polling station itself (specifically, the vote count results at the TPS). All three are surveys derived from measuring a sample (a portion of the population); therefore, the results are statistics, which are inherently conjectural. Since “survey” is synonymous with “polling,” the terms “pre-election polling” and “exit poll” are conceptually accurate. However, what is currently called a “quick count” would be more accurately described as an “election result survey.”
Why isn’t a quick count simply called an “election result survey”? This is not just a matter of how “cool” the terminology is, but involves a deeper discourse. This conceptual distinction can be explained by looking at the political interests behind it. While pre-election surveys have often been published to shape public opinion and steer voter preferences, a different narrative is needed for the election day phase. It is as if something distinct from pre-election surveys—which often face criticism—must be created. Something perceived as more valid and authoritative, even though it uses the same survey methods and is often conducted by the same institutions.
The interests behind the release of quick counts are diverse. The most dominant interest is as a tool for bargaining positions among election contestants. The time gap between the publication of quick counts and the official certification by the General Elections Commission (KPU) serves as a window for political parties to engage in “horse-trading” (dagang sapi) and backroom deals, often ignoring the voices of voters who have just cast their ballots. We can see this phenomenon dominating the media lately.
Do quick counts offer absolute precision in predicting a party’s vote percentage? Of course, many factors must be considered, such as the margin of error, which typically ranges between 1% and 2%. How can one accurately measure the strength of a party predicted at 5%, for instance, when the actual value could shift to 7% or drop to a mere 3%? Furthermore, vote percentages are still far from being a solid basis for estimating parliamentary seat allocation. This is the strategic position of a quick count release: as a trigger for elites to maneuver. It is not merely about satisfying public curiosity regarding the winner, but creating a “pause” between the illusion of certainty and the reality of uncertainty, which elites exploit for mutual bargaining. For example, a 19% figure in a quick count—which is statistical and conjectural—means there is a possibility it is actually 18%, but it could also reach the psychological threshold of 20%. Several days after the election, some survey institutes still haven’t completed 100% of their samples (hovering around 90%) as a “wait and see” strategy to shape initial opinion and drive the political maneuvers of party elites.
The “quick count” must be pushed back toward its true concept and meaning: it should be conducted by election organizers, not survey institutes. A true quick count should rely on population data collection, not sampling. The quick count should be the authority of the KPU, utilizing a computational system to tabulate final results from all polling stations via data formats sent to the KPU server in less than 24 hours. The goal is to immediately identify the winner to provide certainty for the public and contestants, thereby preventing backroom deals. However, the manual count must still be conducted diligently and carefully to determine individual legislative votes and seat allocations.
A quick count by the election organizer (KPU) must be methodologically valid because it produces parameters (absolute, indisputable values from measuring the population). This is distinct from the quick counts we currently know, conducted by survey institutes using sampling techniques, which produce statistics (estimated values that carry a probability of error). Survey institutes can, of course, independently conduct “election result surveys” as a comparison to the quick count performed by the election organizers.
For the 2019 Election, the KPU as the organizer has sufficient time and capacity to prepare a quick count in its true, valid sense—one that yields parameters, not statistics. This would be highly beneficial in preventing the current situation, where the authority and legitimacy to determine the early results of an election are surrendered to survey institutes.
Dirga Ardiansa
Researcher / Statistician
Center for Political Studies (Puskapol) FISIP
University of Indonesia
