Dirga Ardiansa
(Center for Political Studies DIP FISIP – Universitas Indonesia)
This piece attempts to respond to three main discussions in recent studies on political representation. First, that political representation will never deliver a perfect representation of interests and identities, only half or a portion. Therefore representation is about a claim rather than a fact of representation. Second, that democratic political representation happens when those whose interests are affected or touched by a decision have the capacity to be involved in influencing that decision. Third, that political representation can result from both electoral and non electoral processes. The electoral process produces formal political representation within the executive and legislative branches of parliament. In the non electoral process, political representation appears in the form of political movements by groups, unions, communities, or civil society organizations. In the context of political representation practices in Indonesia and their connection to the issue of women’s political representation, this piece looks at the practice of women’s political representation in Indonesia through these three discussions, and offers ideas and recommendations both for efforts to increase the number of women in representation and for efforts to bring women’s interests into the picture.
Introduction
Nuri Soeseno (2013) examines the development of contemporary political representation theory. Toward the end of his work, he highlights several key ideas that serve as a useful starting point for discussing political representation. At least three points frame this discussion and underpin this paper’s analysis of political representation in Indonesia, particularly women’s representation.
First, political representation does not fully capture interests and identities. It tends to reflect only part of them. Representation may therefore rest more on claims than on actual outcomes. In formal political representation, elections are often seen as a mechanism to “bring the people into presence.” Using the logic of population and sample, elections are understood as a way of representing the population, meaning all eligible citizens, by allowing them to choose among themselves and form a representative sample in the form of elected officials. Even when voter turnout is not complete, the process is still considered representative. The problem, however, lies in the sample frame. Are the available choices, political parties and candidates, truly representative? Elections may successfully “bring in” the population, but they do not necessarily produce perfect political representation. This happens for two main reasons. First, voting does not guarantee that voters’ identities and interests align with those of the candidates they select. Second, the choices themselves are limited and often fail to reflect the diversity of society. Efforts to ensure broader representation of identities and interests in electoral politics should not be restricted. To reduce the gap between electoral processes and outcomes, which often result in under representation, affirmative action becomes necessary. It can improve both the range of choices available and the likelihood of more representative outcomes.
In the context of affirmative action for women’s representation, various forms of gender quotas have been identified. Mona Lena Krook (2009) classifies them into three types. Party quotas require political parties to nominate women candidates at a certain percentage. Legislative quotas impose similar requirements but are mandated by law for all competing parties. Reserved seats differ in that they guarantee a specific number or percentage of parliamentary seats for women. The first two types intervene in the candidate selection process by expanding choices, while the third directly shapes the outcome by ensuring representation in parliament.
Debates around gender quotas often focus on increasing the numerical presence of women, which Ann Phillips (1995) argues can promote justice, equality, and the inclusion of women’s interests. It may also enable women to access resources that benefit society at large. However, critics point out that political parties and elites may use quotas strategically, treating them as tools for electoral gain or as a way to capitalize on women’s popularity, as noted by Caul (2001), Meier (2004), and Chowdhury (2002), cited in Krook (2009).
Despite these debates, women in Indonesia have long been excluded from political participation. This historical marginalization has created a gap in political experience between men and women. Political culture, shaped by the absence of women, continues to limit their access to equal opportunities. Simply opening equal competition is not enough to achieve real equality. Women need targeted support to catch up, gain political experience, and compete effectively. Affirmative action through gender quotas is one such effort.
As a transitional measure, the requirement for at least thirty percent women candidates in Indonesia represents a meaningful step. It helps create a history of political participation for women and challenges entrenched patriarchal and oligarchic structures within society and political parties. The first part of this paper therefore examines Indonesia’s experience with affirmative action from the 2004 to the 2014 elections, focusing on strategies to increase women’s representation in parliament.
The second key point concerns the representation of interests. Democratic representation occurs when those affected by decisions have the capacity to influence them. This requires political participation from the groups concerned, both during elections and afterward when elected officials carry out their roles in parliament. Representation is therefore a continuous process.
During elections, interests are presented through limited choices shaped by party platforms and candidate programs. These are often defined in a top down manner by political elites rather than emerging from grassroots demands. To bridge the gap between elections and governance, there needs to be a structured articulation of public demands that binds representatives to their commitments. This requires non electoral actors, such as civil society organizations, to aggregate and sustain public interests beyond election cycles. The second part of this paper explores how women’s interests are represented in parliamentary processes and how elections can serve as a bridge between pre election mobilization and post election policy outcomes.
The third point highlights the role of non electoral political representation. Representation is not limited to elections. While electoral processes produce formal representation within executive and legislative institutions, non electoral processes involve political movements, unions, communities, and civil society organizations. These actors play a crucial role in articulating and defending public interests.
Although political representation is central to democratic systems, it is not without criticism. Common assumptions, such as representation being a direct link between representatives and constituents, can be challenged. Representation is better understood as a dynamic and sometimes antagonistic relationship. Representatives and those they represent may not always share the same position. They can shift between alignment and opposition depending on the interests at stake.
When political representatives fail to uphold agreed interests, claims to representation can emerge from non electoral actors. These actors can reassert public demands and hold representatives accountable, often creating tension between formal institutions and social movements. This dynamic relationship includes both individual ties between voters and representatives and collective ties between citizens and political parties. The third part of this paper examines the strategic role of non electoral actors in advancing women’s political interests.
The Under Representation of Women in Indonesia
Efforts to increase women’s representation through a minimum thirty percent candidate quota in the 2004 election resulted in 65 seats out of 550 in the national parliament, or about eleven percent. In 2009, representation improved to 101 out of 560 seats, or eighteen percent. However, the 2014 election showed stagnation, even a slight decline, with women securing 97 seats or seventeen percent.
A closer comparison between the 2009 and 2014 elections reveals an important pattern. In 2009, women made up 33.6 percent of candidates. They received 22 percent of the vote and ultimately secured 18 percent of parliamentary seats. This shows a consistent drop across stages, from candidacy to votes to seats. Despite various measures to improve representation, such as enforcing quotas at the district level and reducing the number of competing parties, the 2014 election did not produce better outcomes. Women’s representation remained stagnant.
Analyzing Women’s Electoral Success
The number of seats held by women is often used as the main indicator of representation. However, this measure alone does not fully capture electoral strength. In 2009, female candidates received over 16 million votes, or 22 percent of valid votes, a figure higher than their share of seats.
The number of female candidates also affects electoral outcomes. In 2009, women made up 33 percent of candidates and received 22.45 percent of votes, translating into 18 percent of seats. In 2014, their share of candidates increased to 37 percent, and their vote share rose to 23 percent. Yet their seat share declined to 17 percent.
This reveals a consistent pattern across three stages. Candidate nomination, vote share, and seat allocation all show a downward trend. The challenge is to reduce the gap between these stages. Although increased candidacy raises vote share, it does not automatically translate into more seats. Other factors, such as party competition and candidate ranking, also play a role.
The gap between vote share and seat share remains significant. In 2009, a 22 percent vote share could have translated into around 126 seats, yet women secured only 101 seats. A similar gap appeared in 2014. This raises an important question: is this pattern fixed, or can it be improved? The following discussion on each stage explores this issue further.
The Candidate Nomination Stage
At the national level, women’s candidacy in the 2009 election reached 33 percent, meeting the minimum quota. However, this figure masked uneven distribution across electoral districts. Some districts fell below the quota, while others exceeded it. Only about ten percent of districts had less than 29 percent female candidates, suggesting that further improvements were possible by the 2014 election. The five year gap between elections should have allowed parties to address these disparities and strengthen women’s participation across regions.
Areas still facing challenges in nominating female candidates are marked in red, with their distribution largely concentrated in the easternmost and westernmost parts of Indonesia. In the east, Papua, which consists of two electoral districts, Papua and West Papua, continues to show low levels of female candidacy. Elsewhere in eastern Indonesia, North Maluku and South Sulawesi also require attention in this regard.
A similar pattern appears in the far west, particularly in Aceh, which is divided into two electoral districts, Aceh 1 and Aceh 2, with Aceh 1 still facing issues. However, even in Java, a central region close to the country’s political power, there are still areas with low female candidacy rates, namely Central Java 1 and Central Java 3, as well as East Java 10.
Table 1: Electoral Districts That Have Not Met the Minimum Nomination Requirement of 30 Percent
In the 2009 election, the General Elections Commission did not clearly enforce the rule requiring political parties to nominate at least 30 percent women in every electoral district at each legislative level, both national and local. This was not followed by sanctions for parties that failed to meet the minimum quota, as they were still allowed to compete in districts where the requirement was not fulfilled.
In the 2014 election, the number of female candidates reached 2,467 out of a total of 6,619, or about 37 percent. This figure was calculated at the national level for nominations to the House of Representatives. The 2014 election introduced a stricter rule: any political party that did not meet the minimum 30 percent quota of female candidates in a given electoral district was barred from contesting in that district. As a result, all political parties were able to meet the requirement in every district. Even so, in the period leading up to the finalization of candidate lists, several parties claimed difficulties in fulfilling the quota. This claim is difficult to justify, considering that in 2009 only eight districts had failed to meet the requirement, and five years should have been sufficient time to prepare through cadre development and recruitment of female candidates. This suggests that political parties did not seriously invest in recruiting and politically training their female members to strengthen women’s representation. Instead, they tended to treat the quota as a mere administrative requirement in order to participate in elections, with little consideration given to the quality or profile of the women nominated.
Another factor influencing women’s chances of being elected is not only the number of candidates, but also their position on the candidate list. Data from the 2009 election show that the median and most frequent placement of female candidates was at number three, while male candidates were most often placed in the top position. In the 2014 election, the median placement for female candidates shifted to number five, while the most frequent position remained at number three. This indicates a decline in the strategic placement of female candidates in more favorable positions.
Although the electoral system is based on the highest number of votes, the candidate list order still shapes public perception. This can be seen in the following data.
Table 2: Percentage of Elected Legislative Candidates Based on Ballot Order Number in the 2009 Election and the 2014 Election
Source: KPU data processed by Puskapol (2009, 2014)
From the information in the table, in the 2009 election, 90% of legislative candidates with ballot numbers 1 through 3 were elected as members of the legislature. The breakdown is as follows: 64.9% of elected legislators had ballot number 1, 19% had ballot number 2, and 6% had ballot number 3. Only 9% were elected from outside ballot numbers 1, 2, or 3. Looking at the data from the 2014 election, a similar pattern appears, though there is an aggregate decrease. Candidates with ballot number 1 won 62.2%, those with ballot number 2 won 16%, and those with ballot number 3 won 4%. Meanwhile, 16% were elected from outside ballot numbers 1, 2, or 3. This means that voters still tend to make their choice based on the top ballot positions.
There are not many options for changing the current numbers on women’s candidacy, which already require a minimum of 30% of candidates to be women, unless a change is made by adding a mandate to place 30% of female legislative candidates in ballot position number 1 across all electoral districts. However, political parties will still play a determining role and could place women in non strategic districts just to meet the 30% candidacy requirement in position number 1. Another option is to raise the candidacy requirement to 50% with a zipper mechanism or an alternating list of men and women. This mechanism would certainly be difficult for political parties to accept, especially as current trends favor moving toward a closed proportional system with internal technical arrangements that set a 50% zipper system for women and reduce the size of electoral districts. Yet returning to a closed system would set women back in shaping their own political experience through the process of running for office and winning elections. The dominant position of political parties would only strengthen oligarchy by nominating women based on family ties to party elites. This would also hinder potential women with social capital who are capable of bringing not only identity but also women’s interests into parliament.
The Stage of Women’s Vote Acquisition
Based on processing data from the General Election Commission on the votes received by legislative candidates, the total number of valid votes cast by voters in the 2009 legislative election was 104,099,785. Of these, 71,865,110 votes went to individual candidates, both male and female, while 32,234,675 votes went directly to political parties. From the total votes given to individual candidates, 16,134,959 went to female candidates, a figure equivalent to 22%.
The data shows that female candidates were chosen by 22% of voters, representing 16,134,959 voters, including both male and female voters. Male candidates were chosen by 77.54% of voters, representing 55,730,151 voters, again including both male and female voters. Given that this result came from only 3,752 female candidates compared to 7,391 male candidates, it is only natural that male candidates accumulated more votes because their number of nominations was also higher. In the 2014 election, the number of female candidates for the National House of Representatives was 2,467 out of 6,619, equivalent to 37%. This 37% nomination figure produced a valid vote share of 23% for female candidates. It is interesting to look more deeply at the conditions of female candidates’ vote acquisition by political party in the 2014 election, as shown in the table below.
Table 3: Percentage of Political Party Votes and Percentage of Votes for Female Legislative Candidates in 2014
| Party | Votes | % Party votes | Party | % Women’s Votes | ||
| 1 | PDIP | 23.681.471 | 18.95 | 1 | PPP (9) | 26.85 |
| 2 | GOLKAR | 18.432.312 | 14.75 | 2 | PDIP (1) | 25.8 |
| 3 | Gerindra | 14.760.371 | 11.81 | 3 | Demokrat (4) | 24.23 |
| 4 | Demokrat | 12.728.913 | 10.19 | 4 | PKB (5) | 23.62 |
| 5 | PKB | 11.298.957 | 9.04 | 5 | Gerindra (3) | 23.06 |
| 6 | PAN | 9.481.621 | 7.59 | 6 | Hanura (10) | 22.55 |
| 7 | PKS | 8.480.204 | 6.79 | 7 | Golkar (2) | 22.16 |
| 8 | NASDEM | 8.402.812 | 6.72 | 8 | Nasdem (8) | 22.15 |
| 9 | PPP | 8.157.488 | 6.53 | 9 | PAN (6) | 20.68 |
| 10 | Hanura | 6.579.498 | 5.26 | 10 | PKS (7) | 18.23 |
Source: KPU data processed by Puskapol UI (2014)
The data above shows that the position or ranking of political party vote shares in the 2014 election is different from the ranking of women’s vote percentages by political party. The highest percentage of women’s votes actually came from female candidates of PPP at 22%, while PPP’s party vote percentage ranking was in ninth place. Comparing this to Golkar, for example, the situation is reversed. Golkar was in seventh place for the ranking of women’s vote percentage, yet the party itself was the second highest recipient of party votes. Looking further, Golkar and Gerindra, which were in second and third place as the biggest vote earners, were in seventh and fifth place respectively for the percentage of votes earned by their female candidates.
It is possible that if the top three parties with the highest vote totals also produced the same ranking for their female candidates’ vote percentages, this would have helped raise women’s representation numbers beyond the final outcome of the 2014 election. The three political parties with the highest vote totals, especially Golkar and Gerindra, still tend to place women in positions where they are expected to collect votes but not necessarily to win seats.
The Stage of Women’s Seat Acquisition
Based on data on women’s seat acquisition in the 2009 and 2014 elections, there were changes in the number of seats won by women for each political party, so the ranking order for total party seats also changed. The data can be seen below.
Table 4: Party Seat Acquisition and Women’s Seat Acquisition in the 2009 Election and the 2014 Election
| No. | Partai Politik | Pemilu 2009 | Pemilu 2014 | |||
| Total Kursi | Kursi Perempuan | Total Kursi | Kursi Perempuan | Catatan Perubahan Kursi Perempuan | ||
| 1 | PDIP (3) | 94 | 17 (19,1%) | 109 | 21(19,27%) | Naik 4 kursi |
| 2 | Golkar (2) | 106 | 18 (17.9%) | 91 | 16(17,58%) | Turun 2 kursi |
| 3 | Gerindra (8) | 26 | 4 (19.2) | 73 | 11 (15,07%) | Naik 7 kursi |
| 4 | Demokrat (1) | 149 | 35 (23.5%) | 61 | 13 (21,31%) | Turun 22 kursi |
| 5 | PAN (5) | 46 | 7 (15.2%) | 49 | 9 (18,37%) | Naik 2 kursi |
| 6 | PKB (7) | 28 | 7 (25%) | 47 | 10 (21,28%) | Naik 3 kursi |
| 7 | PKS (4) | 57 | 3 (5,3%) | 40 | 1 (2,50%) | Turun 2 kursi |
| 8 | PPP (6) | 38 | 5 (13,2%) | 39 | 10 (25,64%) | Naik 5 kursi |
| 9 | Nasdem | – | – | 35 | 4 (11,43%) | – |
| 10 | Hanura (9) | 17 | 4 (23.5%) | 16 | 2(12,50%) | Turun 2 kursi. |
| 560 | 101 | 560 | 97 | |||
Source: KPU data processed by Puskapol UI (2014)
It cannot be denied that the data description above shows several factors that influence the number of seats won by women and disproves a number of initial assumptions made before the 2014 election. One initial assumption was that reducing the number of political parties contesting the election to 12 would encourage a greater accumulation of seats for women. In reality, this did not automatically convert votes into seats more effectively. With the vote share for female candidates remaining relatively stable at around 22% to 23%, it only produced a seat share of 17% to 18%. This means that party simplification has other consequences. It makes competition among parties more evenly distributed, so that the spread of vote shares across parties becomes wider but with relatively small gaps between them. This is different from when there were more electoral participants and a parliamentary threshold rule, which allowed votes to accumulate into seats that clustered more heavily around several parties with traditional bases. The data shows a positive correlation where a higher number of party seats also increases the number of seats won by women.
It must also be understood that the number of political party contestants, while influential, is not a determining factor in the distribution of votes among political parties. There are other factors, including the political context, that can make the vote and seat shares of winning parties more extreme compared to others. When the distribution of votes and seats among political parties is more even, and given that ballot position numbers still strongly determine electability, it is highly likely that the second or third highest vote earners among women do not accumulate enough additional seats. Instead, those seats are won by other parties, and in most cases, those seats go to men. Furthermore, the fact that the median ballot position number for female candidates increased from 3 in 2009 to 5 in 2014 supports the argument that political parties still treat the nomination requirement as merely an administrative formality.
From these two series of data, it can be interpreted that the even distribution of votes and seats in the 2014 election, or the case of the Democratic Party whose seat share was significantly different from other parties in 2009, had only a small effect on the number of seats won by women and cannot be considered significant. The data above shows that when the Democratic Party lost 22 women’s seats, other parties were able to cover that loss. This piece takes the position that there is a relatively stable pattern. Nominations at 30% to 37% will produce a women’s vote share in the range of 22% to 23% and will accumulate seats between 16% and 18%. This means that the current affirmative action policy on women’s nominations requires a new breakthrough, especially if the goal is to exceed 20%, unless we instead choose to stay in the comfort zone of accepting women’s representation numbers below 20%.
Challenges in Increasing Women’s Electability
Referring to the various issues outlined above, the challenge of increasing women’s electability in parliament is truly complex and influenced by many factors. On one hand, engineering the electoral system and simplifying the number of political parties does not always produce sweet results for increasing women’s electability. Data from the last two elections shows that political parties participating in the elections have become increasingly indifferent to this increase and treat it only as an administrative requirement. Below are several challenges in increasing women’s electability that deserve attention.
Strategies for Increasing Women’s Electability
To improve the chances of women being elected in the 2019 election, several important steps are needed.
First, the open proportional system needs to be maintained. Aside from fighting against oligarchy within political parties, this system also encourages the strengthening of party functions and institutions to become more open and democratic. It challenges political parties to pay attention to political education and sound recruitment mechanisms. Through this system, political parties are essentially being forced to have an ideology, platform, and program, not merely to sell the figures of individual candidates to create differences between one party and another. However, instead of thinking of this as a solution, parties instead argue that the open system has sacrificed important figures or party elites, citing the prevalence of money politics as the reason. Meanwhile, research data from several institutions including Puskapol UI shows that although money politics does occur, its contribution to influencing a person’s political preferences is very small. The key to change lies with the political parties themselves, who need to strengthen their internal institutions. It cannot be denied that political parties are aware of both the strategic importance and the dilemma of this situation. Because under current conditions, oligarchy and nepotism within parties continue to face pressure. Parties that are able to reform their institutions by presenting three things: first, ideology and a platform as the basis for programs, vision, and mission for all members; second, professional recruitment mechanisms and membership or cadre management with a clear career progression in politics; third, a democratic and competency based process for selecting and determining candidates. Returning to a closed proportional system would only strengthen oligarchy and elite power within political parties, making them even more indifferent to the core issues that need fixing, namely creating a platform and ideology as the basis for managing political participation, providing political education, and fixing the recruitment system.
Second, to bring about the true meaning of affirmative action for women’s nominations by encouraging better regulation of women’s nominations through cadre development and stronger internal party institutions, including the application of party quotas for women. First, by implementing a minimum of 30 percent representation for women in party leadership at both central and regional levels. This rule opens access for women to be involved in various policies and decisions made by the party regarding cadre development, membership recruitment, and the nomination of legislative candidates. Second, in the nomination of female legislative candidates by political parties, a balanced recruitment mechanism is also needed. From the total number of women nominated, the recruitment base should be divided. Thirty percent should come from women who are party leaders, 30 percent from party cadres and affiliated mass organizations under the party, and the remaining 30 percent from open recruitment in the community that prioritizes grassroots women.
Third, if state funding is provided, it must be allocated for political education and political recruitment carried out by political parties as described in the second point above. Political parties must also be open and non discriminatory as a consequence of using state funding. It is therefore necessary to identify potential women who can represent women’s political interests, in an effort to encourage parties to nominate female candidates who have quality and potential in their areas of strength. This requires support in the form of a database of potential female candidates that can be pushed by women’s movements, academics, and civil society organizations to political parties, while also considering strategic placement within electoral districts.
Fourth, identifying areas, whether at the district or electoral district level, where votes for female candidates were high based on the 2009 and 2014 election results would be useful for strategies to place female candidates in those potential areas. Meanwhile, in areas that are still unfriendly to female candidates or where women’s electability is low, a strengthening strategy is needed not only from political parties through their political education functions but also from women’s movements and civil society organizations.
Fifth, some political parties argue that the only way to strengthen political party institutions is to switch to a closed proportional electoral system. This represents a logical fallacy. Strengthening party institutions can be done while maintaining an open system, such as by implementing the three points mentioned in the first strategy above. By pushing for a closed system, the parties’ motives are very clear: they want to perpetuate oligarchy, elitism, and nepotism all in the name of institutional strengthening. A closed system would kill the potential for political participation and citizen political education, and would close off space for diversity in political representation. For women, a closed system would kill the potential for the historical experience of women engaging in political contestation, starting from home to running for office and being successfully elected. With the open system, parties are continuously pushed to take recruitment and political education seriously, not merely to fulfill administrative requirements, which is the consequence they now face. Under a closed system, it is possible, though not guaranteed, that women’s electability numbers might increase. However, the problem is that such an increase would not be built on a process that creates women’s distinctive political experience in an ongoing effort to aggregate women’s interests.
III. Challenges in Bringing Interests into Political Representation in Indonesia
According to Anne Phillips (1995), presenting the identity of women in terms of quantity will encourage justice and equality, will help bring about women’s interests, and will allow women to access resources for the good of society as a whole. Susan C. Stokes (2013) argues that politics is a process of allocating and distributing resources to the people with the goal of achieving the common good. Stokes explains the concept of distributive politics as it relates to the strategic process of allocating, through budgeting and legislation, and distributing, through the delivery or execution of programs or policies, state resources involving various parties.
Democratic political representation occurs when those whose interests are affected or touched by a decision have the capacity to be involved in influencing that decision. The capacity to influence a decision means the presence of political involvement or participation from groups affected by the decision to be made. This means that the process of bringing interests into play is longitudinal in nature, meaning it must be pursued repeatedly within the political space.
According to Susan Stokes, distributive politics as a strategy for allocating and distributing resources has two objectives. On one hand, for political parties, candidates, and political officials, it aims to gain and maintain power. On the other hand, for citizens, it is a means of obtaining access to and control over resources. Thus the relationship between political parties, candidates, political officials and voters or citizens is a political relationship that is both important and highly determining in distributive politics. Because each party has different goals in the context of distributive politics, it is unavoidable that their meeting point is bridged through a political transaction based on interests. Elections provide the context where these two political subjects can meet to agree on those interests. From here on, the term candidate refers to legislative candidates, presidential candidates, or regional head candidates.
Elections cannot be avoided as an arena for political transactions involving citizens as voters and political parties, candidates, or political officials. From the perspective of political parties, candidates, and political officials, they attempt to gain support by providing short term resources such as cash and goods to secure citizens’ votes. Meanwhile, citizens need access to more long term resources such as health care, education, employment, infrastructure, and other long term sustainable programmatic benefits. The transactions that have occurred so far constitute a form of money politics that is short term and personal or individual in nature, linking the candidate to the voter, which is detrimental to citizens collectively.
Voters exchange their votes for something fleeting, but which harms their long term interests. Voters are treated as a collection of individuals with no collective interests, so candidates treat them only as individuals with personal interests, not as a unified body of citizens living in a particular area with shared needs, problems, and interests that need to be resolved. The impact of this individualistic transaction process is that the provision of resources to one person or a small group of individuals does not have a positive effect on others. In fact, it is vulnerable to discrimination and harms other people or parties. In the process of mapping collective needs, citizens face increasing difficulty because they are led to think individualistically, in line with the voter education doctrine that has been taught so far, which is to become a smart voter as an individual.
Up to now, candidates have always tried to offer their vision, mission, and programs through campaign promises. What must be ensured is whether the candidate has gathered data on the community’s needs, problems, and demands. The collection of data and the absorption of aspirations must be done by finding out what citizens aspire to regarding their problems, their needs, and their collective demands as citizens living in a particular area. Therefore, it is important for candidates or political parties to find out by conducting observations or surveys, or even to facilitate citizens in conducting their own independent surveys to map their long term and sustainable aspirations and needs in the form of programs. What citizens need to consider when choosing a candidate is who is willing to commit, to listen to aspirations, and to understand community needs. To engage in dialogue with citizens by opening access to information for all citizens in order to realize programs that address citizens’ demands based on citizen led surveys, not merely which candidate has the best campaign promises but is far removed from what citizens actually need.
In a political transaction process between political parties, candidates, or political officials and voters or citizens, the transaction is usually not done directly but requires the role of a third party, which Stokes (2013) calls an intermediary. The term intermediary tends to be interpreted negatively, along with the perception that political transactions are also bad. In terms of recruitment, intermediaries can be divided into two categories. First, intermediaries recruited from above, such as the bureaucracy, political party structures, and political consultants. Second, intermediaries recruited from below, coming from the community, such as citizen support groups and NGOs (Puskapol, 2014). This piece places the intermediary as part of non electoral political representation actors.
The role of intermediaries, as non electoral political representation actors, is very important in distributive politics, especially to reach an agreement that favors the interests of citizens. However, so far this vital role has often been misused to support short term political agreements that only benefit the candidate in getting elected. Citizen support groups and civil society organizations also often get trapped in the candidate contestation space by becoming community political elites. Their role is more as mobilizers of the support of the citizens they assist toward a particular candidate, following a political agreement between the candidate and the citizen support elites that does not involve the citizens themselves.
Intermediaries have three important roles: as connectors, as distributors, and as mobilizers. The role as a connector means opening access and helping to establish communication between voters or citizens and candidates, political officials, or political parties. At a deeper level, the intermediary must be able to voice the interests of voters or citizens and make demands of the candidate, political official, or political party. The role as a distributor means giving something, in this case access to information. Their role toward the candidate is to provide information on citizens’ aspirations and demands. Meanwhile, toward citizens, the intermediary provides information on policies and programs for the community. The role as a mobilizer means organizing, mobilizing, and gathering citizens. (Puskapol, 2014)
The way elections are viewed is an important point for long term citizen participation and involvement. In distributive politics, elections must be seen as a recurring cycle consisting of three stages: first, the pre election stage; second, the election stage; and third, the post election stage. The pre election stage includes the process of mapping citizen problems, absorbing aspirations and planning allocations, and learning about the ideology, platform, and programs of political parties or candidates. Then the election stage during the campaign period includes the process of organizing to reach a political agreement containing the main points of citizens’ demands for the allocation and distribution of resources to all political parties or candidates. Meanwhile, the post election stage includes the process of citizen participation or involvement together with non electoral representation actors in monitoring and bringing interests back to the table to ensure that the points on resource allocation and distribution are realized by the legislative and executive branches.
The Women’s Movement as Non Electoral Political Representation in Bringing Forward Women’s Interests
Discussing the formulation of women’s interests, it emerges from experience and empirical facts in the form of discrimination, injustice, and inequality that women face in their daily lives. These various problems are then pushed to become discourse or issues that can become public debates voiced by the women’s movement. The women’s movement needs to formulate interests in the lead up to elections so that these can be accommodated by political parties as political agendas once they are in parliament. The women’s movement also needs to bring back these formulated demands for interests, during the election moment, into the political spaces after the election so that political parties do not renege on the political agendas demanded of them. The existing political spaces include legislative debates in parliament, responding to government policies, and the process of creating public discourse through actions that push for the discussion or passage of regulations.
The women’s movement as non electoral political representation actors, together with political parties and female members of parliament, requires synergy in bringing forward and realizing interests at the levels of legislation and budgeting. The goal, of course, is to push for the discussion of regulations and budgets that can produce rules that empower, show preferential treatment, and create justice and equality for women.
The five year National Legislation Program is a target for women’s interests. The annual agenda is a moment for intervention that must be pursued. With around 40 draft laws discussed each year, originating either from carryovers from previous years or new draft laws, this is a collaborative space where the women’s movement and political parties must work together to bring forward women’s interests. Proposed agendas for the National Legislation Program must refer to the formulation of women’s agendas previously aggregated during the election period so that there is a connection between aspirations during the election and execution in the post election period. Of course, space for responding to and proposing new issues remains open, in line with the facts of women’s daily political lives where new problems may emerge.
Collaboration between the women’s movement and the presence of female legislators in parliament from 1999 to 2014 has succeeded in pushing through a number of political agendas in the form of laws that favor women’s interests. These laws include the Domestic Violence Law, the Human Trafficking Law, the Citizenship Law, the Health Law, the Election Law, and others. Nevertheless, there are still several laws or regulations that have negative impacts on women, such as the Pornography Law, which is vulnerable to being misused to marginalize women. To this day, there are also several draft laws concerning women’s interests that are still undergoing lengthy processes and debates. These include the protection of domestic workers, sexual harassment, and a draft law that could serve as an umbrella for gender mainstreaming in Indonesia, namely the draft law on gender justice and equality.
Efforts to discuss the draft law on the protection of domestic workers have created a discourse that has produced sharp divisions, not only among parliament members, including female parliament members, but also among the women’s movement outside parliament. The issue of protecting domestic workers is not only about women but also touches on class. One of the debates, regarding whether wages for domestic workers should follow the minimum wage standard, has created a split within the women’s movement over taking a unified position on this issue.
Among the various problems found in daily politics, so many corner women. These range from the imposition of curfews for women in several regions, virginity tests for students and job applicants, requiring female civil servants to leave the office earlier so they can prepare for their domestic duties, sexual violence experienced by female migrant workers in various countries, and many other issues specific to women that desperately need solutions through ways of thinking and approaches that favor women’s interests. The arena of struggle for women’s interests is not only visible at the national level but also at the regional level. According to a report from the Indonesian Women’s Coalition, to this day rural women are still faced with various problems such as poverty, food insecurity, gender based violence, culturally based violence, and low access to public services, especially health care, education, population administration, and civil registration.
The International Labour Organization found that a gender wage gap still exists in Indonesia, with a difference of up to 19% in 2012. Data shows that women earn on average 81% of men’s wages, even when they have the same education level and experience. In Indonesia, women represent approximately 38% of the civil service, but more than one third perform “traditional” jobs, such as teaching and caregiving, which tend to pay less than male dominated jobs.
The National Commission on Violence Against Women recorded that there are currently around 342 discriminatory policies, an increase compared to 2012 when there were 282, and earlier in 2011 when there were 207. Referring to the 342 discriminatory policies, according to data from the National Commission, 265 of them directly target women on the basis of religion and morality. An elaboration of the 265 policies that discriminate against women shows that by substance, 76 regulate clothing, 124 deal with prostitution and pornography, and 27 concern the separation of access to public space between men and women on moral grounds. There are also 35 policies related to curfews that reduce women’s right to freedom of movement, choice of employment, and legal protection and certainty. The National Commission also recorded that the regions issuing the most discriminatory policies are West Java, West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, Aceh, South Kalimantan, South Sumatra, and East Java.
Looking at the various problems described above, a draft law that can serve as an umbrella for gender mainstreaming in Indonesia is urgently needed, namely the draft law on gender justice and equality. This law is important so that a number of regional regulations can refer to it and not contradict it. Meanwhile, gender mainstreaming itself has so far only been regulated by a presidential instruction issued in the era of President Abdurrahman Wahid in the year 2000, known as Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2000, to regulate gender mainstreaming within ministries and the bureaucracy. This authority was given to the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection, implemented in the form of various socialization and training activities for various ministries. One achievement of this presidential instruction is the implementation of gender responsive budgeting within the bureaucracy, which regulates the disaggregation of beneficiaries in budgeting, thereby ensuring that beneficiaries are specifically identified for women. Nevertheless, the women’s movement is fully aware of the importance of carrying out gender mainstreaming in various realms, not only the bureaucracy. Moreover, this should be at the level of a law, not just a presidential instruction. The challenge of realizing the draft law on gender justice and equality of course lies in the discussion process in parliament, with the determining power residing in political parties.
Given the possibility that the political interests of women that are demanded are then hijacked or ignored by their representatives, the claim to political representation could come from anywhere, including non electoral political representation claims, to bring back those interests, then to force and demand commitment to those interests, ultimately forming an antagonistic relationship. Amid the contestation of interests between political parties in parliament, the dynamics of the relationship between political movements and formal political representation can change. The identification of “us” might include a political party that aligns on a particular interest, taking the same step as the non electoral political movement against “them,” who are identified as opposing forces consisting of other political parties and their interests. Discourse must be created by the women’s movement to push for a split between political forces that are for and against the draft law on gender justice and equality. Mapping the positions of political parties will open space for public support for political parties that favor women’s interests. Thus, in the lead up to an election, evaluating the performance of political parties and their position on strategic issues for women can be assessed over the five year period of regulatory discussion in parliament. For political parties, the space for support ahead of an election moment is always strategic.
Therefore, it is important that elections be viewed as a recurring cycle consisting of three stages: pre election, election, and post election. The pre election stage includes the process of mapping women’s problems and needs, absorbing aspirations and planning allocations, and learning about the ideology, platform, and programs of political parties or candidates and their alignment with women’s political interests. Then the election stage during the campaign period includes the process of organizing to reach a political agreement containing the main points of demands for the allocation and distribution of resources from women’s groups and movements to all political parties or candidates. And the post election stage includes the process of women’s participation or involvement together with non electoral representation actors in monitoring and bringing back women’s interests to ensure that the points on resource allocation and distribution are realized by the legislative and executive branches.
Challenges for Political Representation in Indonesia in Bringing Forward Interests
There are several challenges for political representation in Indonesia in bringing forward interests. First, the relationship that dominates is the relationship between voters and their candidates, which is more personal and pragmatic rather than based on shared political interests. Political parties as institutions are absent from the electoral contestation. What appears instead is a contestation among individual legislative candidates, both across parties and within the same party. Political parties need to present themselves with platforms and ideologies to shape and create the collective identity of voters based on an aggregative relationship between citizens, as a collection of individuals, and the political party. Platforms and ideologies will become the basis for control and the formation of shared awareness.
Second, voter education as it has been predominantly carried out steers voters toward becoming individuals who are separate from one another, rather than as citizens with collective needs and shared interests. Voter education often only facilitates techniques for finding information about candidate profiles, track records, and the vision and mission being offered, so that the orientation is toward becoming a smart voter, choosing the best among the available options. This alone is very insufficient. In fact, it tends to create disappointment if voters cling to the belief that their interests can be entrusted to an individual, when in reality it is the political party that should be responsible for aggregating interests and realizing them. Forcing political parties to become the target for demands on interests is necessary. Furthermore, political education must be present to encourage citizen participation, not only to vote or exercise their right to vote, but to encourage political participation in the form of being involved in producing and formulating shared interests during the election period, monitoring them, and even being involved in demanding those interests again in the post election period if political parties renege on regulatory and budgetary discussions.
Third, non electoral political representation actors, such as civil society organizations, movements, and unions, often perform the function of aggregating interests in an elitist manner and do not encourage citizen political participation that gives citizens access to be involved in influencing decisions. In addition, non electoral representation actors sometimes get trapped in transacting their interests with one political force, thus failing to see that the interests they champion must be able to be present and realized regardless of who eventually wins political office.
Fourth, election moments are still seen as a political routine. The way elections are viewed is an important point for long term citizen participation and involvement. In distributive politics, elections must be seen as a recurring cycle consisting of three stages: pre election, election, and post election, as explained in the previous section.
Fifth, political representation is a form of relationship that can be antagonistic in nature. The representative and the represented are not always in a state of harmony but can transform into an “us” and “them” or “friend” or “foe” dynamic. This means the relationship formed is dynamic, referring to the interests at the center of the discourse that define the form of the relationship between them. Given the possibility that the agreed upon political interests are then hijacked or ignored by the representative, the claim to political representation could come from anywhere, including non electoral political representation claims, to bring back those interests, then to force and demand commitment to those interests, ultimately forming an antagonistic relationship. The role of non electoral political representation actors becomes extremely important in the process of aggregating and bringing forward interests, including encouraging antagonism between political forces in parliament toward a particular discourse or issue.
Recommendations
- There needs to be improvement and strengthening of the open proportional system with the highest vote mechanism. It must be recognized that political representation currently has two dimensions of relationships. First, a relationship based on the individual connection between a voter with their vote and a candidate or their people’s representative. Second, a relationship based on the aggregative connection between citizens, as a collection of individuals, and political parties. At present, political parties focus only on the first dimension of relationship, which is selling the figures or personalities of legislative candidates in the legislative election to connect with voters. Political parties tend to neglect the second dimension, which is presenting ideology, platforms, ideas, and programs that they will contest and fight for, different from other parties, so that they are able to aggregate the interests of citizens. The open proportional system has already provided the foundation for these two dimensions of relationship to be present together and to strengthen each other, rather than choosing only one form of relationship. Therefore, political parties now need to work on the second dimension by improving their institutions through three things. First, political parties need to present themselves with platforms and ideologies to shape and create the collective identity of voters based on the aggregative relationship between citizens, as a collection of individuals, and the political party. Platforms and ideologies will become the basis for control and the formation of shared awareness, not the individual which has been the binding factor so far. Second, recruitment mechanisms and membership management must have a clear career progression in politics. Third, democratic and competency based mechanisms for selecting and determining candidates, based on ideology, and especially the need for special rules for affirmative nomination of women within political parties.
- There needs to be encouragement for better cadre development, membership, and internal party institutions through the implementation of party quotas for women. First, implementing a minimum of 30 percent representation for women in party leadership at both central and regional levels. This rule opens access for women to be involved in various policies and decisions made by the party regarding cadre development, membership recruitment, and the nomination of legislative candidates. Second, in the nomination of female legislative candidates by political parties, a balanced recruitment mechanism is also needed. From the total number of women nominated, the recruitment base should be divided. Thirty percent should come from women who are party leaders, 30 percent from party cadres and affiliated organizations under the party, and the remaining 30 percent from open recruitment in the community that prioritizes women. If state funding is provided, it must be allocated for political education and political recruitment carried out by political parties as described in the third point above. Political parties must also be open and non discriminatory as a consequence of using state funding. It is therefore necessary to identify potential women who can represent women’s political interests, in an effort to encourage parties to nominate female legislative candidates who have quality and potential in their areas of strength. This requires support in the form of a database of potential female candidates that can be pushed by women’s movements, academics, and civil society organizations to political parties, while also considering strategic placement within electoral districts.
- There needs to be a paradigm shift in voter education. Voter education as it has been predominantly carried out steers voters toward becoming individuals who are separate from one another. It should instead steer them toward becoming citizens who have collective needs and shared interests. Voter education often only facilitates techniques for finding information about candidate profiles, track records, and the vision and mission being offered, so that the orientation is toward becoming a smart voter, choosing the best among the available options. This alone is very insufficient. Political education must be present to encourage citizen participation, not only to vote or exercise their right to vote, but to encourage political participation in the form of being involved in producing and formulating shared interests during the election period, monitoring them, and even being involved in demanding those interests again in the post election period if political parties renege on regulatory and budgetary discussions.
- The women’s movement needs to make claims of non electoral political representation to bring back interests. There is an urgency for the women’s movement to force and demand commitment from political parties to women’s interests, ultimately forming an antagonistic relationship. The role of non electoral political representation actors becomes extremely important in the process of aggregating and bringing forward interests, including encouraging antagonism between political forces in parliament toward a particular discourse or issue.
- The General Election Commission needs to issue regulations for the campaign stage of elections so that the campaign process opens up space for deliberation that brings together the platforms, visions, missions, and programs of political parties with the aggregation and formulation of interests that have been produced between citizens and non electoral political representation movements. Make the platforms, visions, missions, and programs of political parties into living documents throughout the election process. These should be able to be discussed through open debate and public debate mechanisms. There should also be space for parties to make revisions, additions, or reductions during the campaign process to accommodate demands for interests that emerge from below. These documents will become a shared reference for bringing interests back into parliamentary discussions.
*Presented for the Symposium of the Research Cluster on Political Representation at the Center for Political Studies, DIP FISIP, University of Indonesia
Dirga Ardiansa
(Pusat Kajian Politik DIP FISIP – Universitas Indonesia)
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