This study examines the roles played by Egyptian political actors during the transition period and how these roles contributed to the failure of the democratic transition. The actors include: 1) the military specifically the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which assumed interim power during the transition; 2) Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi factions; 3) old-regime elites (the status quo), comprising remnants of the Mubarak regime whether still within the political structure or sidelined; and 4) secular groups, consisting of elites and civil society activists who emerged following the anti-Mubarak revolution. The interactions among these actors are analyzed using the conceptual framework of democratic transition and the theory of elite transition proposed by Higley and Burton. The analysis reveals a failure to reach an “elite settlement” among Egyptian political actors, driven by ideological differences and the inability to manage a coalition between Islamist and secular groups. Furthermore, the study finds an absence of “elite convergence,” as the actors demonstrated a low level of commitment to democracy as the sole “rule of the game.” These factors resulted in political instability that culminated in a military coup, marking the failure of Egypt’s democratic transition.
Article Author: Hurriyah
